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ABSTRACT 
This  paper  provides  a  cross-country comparison  of the  role of government 
budget  deficits  in determining  the  course  of  macroeconomic  activity.  Government 
deficits  have  been  accused  of contributing to excessive money  growth,  inflation, 
high  interest  rates,  the  crowding  out  of  private demand,  etc.  The  purpose  of 
this paper  is to examine  systematically and  within  a  uniform  econometric  struc-
ture  the effects of government  budget  deficits as  well  as  the  modes  of  finan-
cing  these deficits on  macroeconomic  activity. 
Section  I  provides  an  initial brief outline of  the  issues  involved  and 
the  inadequacies  found  in the  relevant  literature. 
Section  II  reviews  the  Literature that  has  examined  the  role of govern-
ment  budget  deficits as  well  as  their  financing  in affecting macroeconomic 
activity. 
Section  III provides  a  comparative discussion of  central  bank's 
role  in  financing  government  deficits across  the  countries of our  sample  -
Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  the  United  Kingdom,  Japan 
and  the United  States. 
Section  IV  examines  systematically how  the objectives of central  bank 
policy affect  the  financing  of  the government  budget  deficit.  Reaction 
functions  are  estimated  for  each  country  depending  upon  the exchange  rate  regime 
and  imposing  the  cross-equation parameter  constraints  implied  by  the government 
budget  constraint. 
Section  V considers  the effect of government  budget  deficits on  macro-
economic  activity through  the vector  autoregressive methodology.  The  findings 
and  policy  conclusions  along  with  their  comparison  of those of the  Literature 
are brought  together  in Section VI. ;; 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years,  economists,  in particular,  and  the public,  in general, 
have  carried on  a  debate concerning the role of government  budget 
deficits in determining  the course of macroeconomic  activity.  At  one 
time or another,  government  deficits have  been accused of contributing 
to excessive money  growth,  inflation, high interest rates,  the crowding 
out of private demand,  etc.  The  purpose of this paper is to examine 
systematically the effect of government  budget deficits as well as  the 
modes  of financing  these deficits on  macro-economic  activity. 
This more  systematic analysis  involves  two  dimensions.  First,  the 
existing economic  literature usually examines  the experience of  one 
country.  A cross-country comparison of the issues  involved within a 
uniform econometric structure should provide valuable  information.  For 
example,  do  differing policy objectives lead to differing modes  of 
financing budget deficits or are the modes  of financing  budget deficits 
unrelated to the policy objectives of  government?  Second,  most  studies 
have  neglected the information contained in the government  budget 
constraint.  That is, a  study might  estimate a  reduced-form regression 
of base-money  growth on  certain variables,  including the  government  budget 
deficit.  The  exact relationship between the budget deficit and  changes 
in base money,  government  bonds  held by  the private sector,  and  inter-
national reserves  is ignored.  We  propose to rectify these  inadequacies 
by  developing  a  cross-country study that incorporates the  government 
budget constraint. 
In Section II, we  review some  of the literature that has  examined  the 
role of government  budget deficits as well  as their financing  in 
affecting macroeconomic  activity.  Much  of the literature has  consid~red 
the question of whether or not  budget deficits are inflationary. 
Consequently,  the review is heavily slanted in that direction.  Neverthe-
less,  our analysis  considers  the deficit-inflation question as  only one 
of  a  number  of interrelated macroeconomic  questions. 
Section III provides a  comparative discussion of  the central bank's 
role in financing  government deficits across  the countries in our -2-
sample.  We  have  included six countries  from  the  European  Community  -
Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  the Netherlands  and  the United 
Kingdom  - Japan and  the United States.  The  government  financing 
constraint is given by 
G - T  dB  +  dBCB  (I) 
where  G-T  is the government  budget deficit,  dB  is the  change  in 
government debt held by  the private sector,  and  dBCB  is the change  in 
the central bank's holding of  (net)  claims on  government.  Consequently, 
we  shall compare  the countries  in our  sample  as  to how  they differ in 
financing  government deficits  through changes  in B and  BcB· 
Section IV  examines  systematically how  the objectives of central bank 
policy affect  the financing of  the government  budget deficit.  We  shall 
assume  that the central bank  is faced with a  government  budget deficit 
and  that the modes  of  financing  the deficit reflect central bank policy. 
First,  the central bank's  choice as  to dBCB  determines  dB.  Second, 
dBCB  is equal  to dH  minus  dR  where  dH  is the  change  in base money  and 
dR  is the change  in central bank holdings of  (net)  foreign assets.  We 
shall view the budget  financing decision (i.e., dH,  dB,  and  dR)  as 
eminating from  central bank reaction functions.  For  each country,  we 
shall estimate two  or three reaction functions,  depending  upon  the 
exchange rate regime,  and  impose  the cross-equation parameter constraints 
implied by  the government  budget  constraint. 
Section V considers  the effect of  government  budget deficits on 
macroeconomic  activity (i.e., wage  and  price inflation,  interest rates, 
etc.).  The  approach is the vector autoregressive methodology  suggested 
by  Sims  (1980).  Thus,  our analysis is not  based on  any~ priori 
structural model. 
Finally,  Section VI  contains the  summary  and  conclusions. (2) 
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II.  BUDGET  DEFICITS  AND  ECONOMIC  ACTIVITY:  A REVIEW 
In examining  the existing literature, it is obvious  that considerable 
controversy exists  concerning the effect of  government  budget deficits 
on  economic  activity.  The  controversy centers upon  whether budget 
deficits affect  economic  activity through their mere  existence or 
whether it is the methods  of  financing deficits that ultimately determine 
their effect on  economic  activity. 
Neo-Keynesian analysis  suggests  that deficit spending is expansionary 
independent of  the financing  mode.  With  significant slack in the 
economy,  government budget deficits stimulate aggregate demand  and, 
hence,  employment  and  output for both money  and  bond  financing;  while 
at or near full  employment,  deficits are inflationary.  The  debate 
focuses  on which method  of financing is more  expansionary.  Short-run 
IS-LM  analysis  ~uggests that  money-financed  deficits are more  expansionary. 
Long-run  IS-LM  analysis  with  the government  budget  constraint suggests 
that  bond-financed deficits are more  expansionary1• 
Monetarist analysis generally argues  that bond-financed deficits have 
a  neutral effect on real economic  activity.  That is,  increases  in 
public demand  "crowd  out" private demand  leaving little, if any, 
increase in total demand2•  On  the other hand,  money-financed deficits 
are inflationary because  inflation is primarily a  monetary phenomenon. 
Whether  the increase in the money  stock occurs directly - the treasury 
sells bonds  to the central bank - or indirectly - the central bank buys 
.government  bonds  from,  while the treasury sells bondy  to - the private 
sector is irrelevant;  the net result is an increasing money  stock and 
price level. 
The  crowding out effect as  a  result of bond-financed deficits has 
several explanations.  First, bond  sales drive up  interest rates which 
reduce private demand.  This  interest-rate-induced crowding out is 
obtained in any  bare-bones  IS-LM  model.  Second,  a  more  sophisticated 
and,  thus,  controversial explanation is that the private sector considers -4-
bonds  and  tax-financed  government  expenditure equivalently.  Bond-
financed  expenditure implies future  taxes.  Under  certain assumptions, 
the discounted value of  these future  taxes  equals  the value of the bonds 
issued  to  finance  the expenditure.  Thus,  we  have  the  equivalence,  in a 
present value sense,  of bond- and  tax-financed government  expenditure 
(See  Barro  (1974))3• 
The  area receiving the most  attention in recent years  is whether or not 
government  budget deficits are inflationary.  As  mentioned  above,  Neo-
Keynesians  argue  that deficits are inflationary only if the  economy  is 
operating at or near full  employment.  Monetarists,  on the other hand, 
argue that deficits are inflationary when  and  if the deficits are 
monetized.  Monetization would  occur under  a  policy regime where  the 
monetary authorities are targeting interest rates.  In such a  policy 
regime,  the monetary authorities are pressured to monetize deficits to 
defend the interest rate targets;  the resulting inflation is the "price" 
they pay. 
Buchanan  and  Wagner  (1977)  take the monetarist  argument  one step 
further.  They  suggest  that in the United States, direct and  indirect 
political pressure will force  the hand  of  the monetary authorities.  They 
will be required to monetize  the deficit (i.e., stabilize interest rates); 
independent policy action is not  an option. 
The  link between the budget deficit and  its monetization for both 
monetarists  and  Buchanan  and  Wagner  is the interest rate.  Whether  or 
not  the interest-rate linkage is operative,  however,  depends  upon 
whether  and  to what  extent  the current generation of voters foresee  the 
future  tax liabilities associated with bond-financed deficits.  If these 
future  tax liabilities are fully anticipated,  then bond  financing is 
equivalent to tax financing.  Therefore,  bond-financed deficits will not 
'  d  •  1  k  •  •  •  4  put pressure on money  an  cap1ta  mar  ets caus1ng 1nterest rates to r1se; -5-
the link between the budget deficit and  its monetization is broken.5 
To  a  monetarist,  controlling inflation requires controlling the rate of 
money  growth;  interest rates must  be  allowed  to adjust in response  to 
market  forces.  Recently,  Sargent  and  Wallace  (1981)  have  challenged 
the ability of the monetary authorities to control inflation in the long 
run.  Their premise is that  the private sector's demand  for  government 
bonds  places  an effective constraint on the degree of  independence 
between monetary and  fiscal policy.  The  question is who,  monetary or 
fiscal authorities,  dominates  policy making.  For  example,  if the fiscal 
authorities dominate and  are expanding  the stock of government  bonds 
more  rapidly than the central bank is adding  government  bonds  to its 
portfolio,  then the supply of bonds  to  the private sector is expanding 
more  rapidly than base money.  This portfolio shift cannot continue 
indefinitely.  Either the interest rate will become  too high and/or  the 
demand  for government  bonds  will become  perfectly inelastic.  When  this 
occurs,  then the monetary authorities must  accommodate  fiscal policy. 
In the reverse case,  fiscal policy must  accommodate  monetary policy when 
the monetary authorities dominate policy making.  Here,  the monetary 
authorities do  control the rate of  inflation in the  long run. 
This  cursory discussion suggests  that there is substantial disagreement 
among  economists  about  the effect of  government  deficits on economic 
activity.  We  now  turn to  examine  some  of the empirical  evidence on th; 
role of  government deficits in the  economy.  In some  cases,  the role of 
government deficits is peripheral to the central themes  of  the papers. 
Nevertheless,  these papers were  included because  they do  speak to the 
issues under discussion in this paper. 
A series of papers  examining  the  inflation problem was  published as 
Volume  8  of the Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 
(1978).  The  authors of  the papers  (i.e. Korteweg,  Fourcans,  Fratianni, -6-
Dutton,  Neumann,  Jonson  and  Taylor,  and  Korteweg  and  Meltzer)  generally 
examined  the relative  importance of the most  proximate determinants of 
inflation in various countries.  The  underlying analytical structure of 
the  empirical analyses  was  based on dynamic  aggregate demand  and  aggregate 
supply curves  whose  interaction provides  a  solution for  the  inflation rate 
as well as  the rate of output  growth.  Persistent movements  in the price 
level are caused by both policy and  foreign  impulses.  Policy  impulses 
are either fiscal or monetary  in origin.  Monetary  impulses occur because 
of open market operations,  fiscal actions  that affect base money,  and  a 
foreign  impulse working  through the balance of payments  (i.e.,  the 
balance-of-payments effect on base money).  Fiscal  impulses  are a 
result of tax and  expenditure policy.  Two  additional non-monetary 
foreign  impulses  are employed  - the foreign inflation rate and  the foreign 
growth of real output.  All  of these impulses  are  then used  to explain 
movements  in the domestic  inflation and  output growth rates.  These 
estimating equations would  be viewed ordinarily as  reduced  form 
regressions.  From  the global perspective,  however,  the equations are 
not  complete reduced forms.  That is, for any country,  the non-monetary 
foreign  impulses  are ultimately driven by  foreign policy impulses. 
Consequently,  pushed  to the limit,  one could estimate domestic  inflation 
and  output  growth rates as  functions of policy impulses  - both domestic 
and  foreign. 
In their introduction,  Brunner and  Meltzer  (1978)  carefully delineated 
the role of the government  budget  constraint in linking together the 
various  impulses.  That is, the domestic monetary  impulse,  the monetary 
impulse  through the balance of payments,  and  the fiscal  impulse 
(if measured  by  the government  deficit)  are related to  each other through 
the government  budget constraint.  Although the authors occasionally 
noted this interdependence  (e.g.,  Fourcans  (1978,  p.  98)),  they did not 
utilize this  information in performing or interpreting their empirical 
work.  One  commentator  (i.e., Schwartz  (1978)  p.  195))  was  concerned 
about  this interdependence between  impulses. -7-
The  results,  although covering a  number  of countries,  exhibited  some 
consistency.  The  monetary  impulse  was  generally the major factor 
explaining inflation and  output growth rates.  The  fiscal  impulse was 
usually a  minor  factor. 
Gordon  (1977)  investigated empirically alternative hypotheses  of 
inflation - international monetarist versus  cost push - for  eight 
industrial countries.  The  theoretical  framework  built upon  Gordon's 
(1975)  demand  and  supply analysis of inflation.  ~  demand  for monetary 
accommodation  (and  thus  inflation)  emanates  from  the beneficiaries of 
inflation;  the stimuli of this demand  are domestic demand  shifts, 
domestic  cost push,  and  foreign demand  and  supply shocks.  The  supply of 
inflation depends  upon  the central bank's degree of monetary  accommodation 
of the demand  pressures;  this accommodation  is subject  to the central 
bank's reaction function (i.e., what  is the central bank's attitude 
toward  accommodation?)  and  the central bank's degree of  independence 
from.  government.  If the central bank is not  independent  in formulating 
policy,  then the degree of accommodation will be determined by  the 
government  and  its "voter maximizing" behaviour.  If the central bank is 
independent,  then its reaction to accommodation pressures will be 
determined  by  its monetary reaction function subject,  however,  to the 
conflicts between the ultimate economic  goals. 
Gordon  tested for the  importance of demand  factors  - shifts in domestic 
demand,  wage  push,  import prices,  international reserves,  and  domestic 
unemployment  - as  sources of monetary accommodation  and determinants of 
domestic money-stock behaviour.  The  full-employment  budget deficit was 
introduced as  a  domestic demand  shock.  Money,  wage,  and  price equations 
were  run for the eight countries  - both independently and  pooled.  Gordon 
concluded that,  "The  basic message of  the results is that  the inter-
· national monetarists fare better than the wage-push  group  The  wage-
push hypothesis  appears  to be alive and  well as  an explanation of wage -8-
rates, but  not  as  a  theory of  inflation or of monetary growth."  (1977, 
pp.  431-3).  The  fiscal deficit variable was  included  in the money 
equation but was  significant at the five-percent  level with the correct 
sign only for  Japan. 
Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1981)  examined  the  linkage between government 
deficits, money  growth,  and  inflation for a  sample  of  seven,  mostly-
industrialized countries.  They  developed  a  theoretical aggregate demand 
and  aggregate  supply model  of  the macro  economy  to motivate their 
econometric analysis.  First, they estimated money  growth equations 
that depended  upon  budget deficits, wage  inflation,  the  unemployment 
rate,  and  changes  in foreign assets.  They  found  a  significant positive 
relationship between budget deficits and  money  growth in only three 
countries  (i.e., Guatemala,  Israel,  and  Norway).  Moreover,  in five 
countries,  wage  inflation was  positive and  significant in the money 
growth equation.  This,  they argued,  confirmed  that monetary policy has 
accommodated  wage  pressure.  Second,  they estimated price and  wage 
inflation equations.  Price inflation was  regressed onto money  growth, 
import price and  wage  inflation,  and  a  variable representing changes  in 
fiscal policy.  Money  growth was  not significant in any  country while 
the fiscal variable was  significant in three countries  (i.e., Finland, 
Ireland,  and  Israel).  They  concluded that:  •••  wage  inflation is an 
important determinant of money  growth."  (1981,  p.  340)  and  that  " 
they  (their results)  do  not  confirm the accepted wisdom  that budget 
deficits are the dominate  source of money  growth."  (1981,  p.  341). 
Willett and  Laney  {1978)  examined  two  issues  - the  inflation-unemployment 
relationship and  demand-pull versus  cost-push inflation - in Italy and 
the United  Kingdom •.  They  considered  the effect of  import price 
inflation, wage  inflation,  international reserve flows,  and  budget 
deficits on money  growth.  The  evidence suggested that both wage 
inflation and  budget deficits have  been major  causes of money  growth  in 
both countries.  Import price inflation was  significant in both countries -9-
while  international reserve  flows  were  significant only in Italy.  They 
concluded  that,  "While we  are quite sympathetic  to monetarists critiques 
on many  aspects of the  'wage-push view'  of inflation we  have  argued  that 
there is another aspect  of  the wage  push view,  the  influence of wage 
increase on  monetary expansion,  which  cannot  be rejected from  the 
evidence we  have  considered."  (1978,  p.  331).  We  note that in the last 
conclusion,  Willett and  Laney  agree with Dornbusch  and  Fischer but 
disagree with Gordon.  These  three papers,  however,  consider different 
countries with different models  over different time periods. 
Parkin  (1975)  and  Akhtar  and  Wilford  (1978)  also have considered  the 
linkage between budget deficits and money  growth and  thus  inflation in 
the United Kingdom.  Parkin's analysis  supported the existence of a 
positive relationship between government deficits and money  growth. 
Akhtar  and  Wilford  reached  a  similar conclusion when  they examined  the 
effect of budget deficits on money  growth.  Their model  related the 
money  stock to base money  through a  banking multiplier;  base money  was 
broken into foreign and  domestic components.  Changes  in the latter 
represented the monetized portion of  the government deficit.  The  change 
in the domestic  component  of base money  was  dependent  upon  the government 
deficit,  the minimum  lending rate  (a proxy for the authorities ability 
to raise funds  through the sale of government  securities),  and  the market 
interest rate.  Finally,  they analyzed and  tested the effect of  the. public-
sector borrowing  requirement  in M3.  Their results  " ••  supports  the view 
that the public sector deficit has been an important  influence on the 
money  stock in the United Kingdom  •••  While  •••  its size is rather 
modest."  (1978,  p.  12).  They  also supported the view that monetary 
policy is accommodating  and  passive to fiscal policy. 
Akhtar  and  Wilford's results were criticized by  Cobham  (1980)  as· failing 
to provide a  theoretical explanation of why  monetary policy was 
accommodating  budget deficits passively.  After altering the data in -10-
several ways,  Cobham  found  evidence that monetary policy was  passive in 
the  1960s  but  not  in the  1970s. 
McMillin and  Beard  (1980)  (M-B),  using  a  structural model,  ex~ined 
the  short  run effect of fiscal actions  on  the money  stock in the United 
States.  Their model  incorporated  endogenous  taxes,  wealth,  and 
inflationary expectations with unborrowed  reserves  as  the monetary 
policy variable.  The  model  was  tested both with and  without  a  Federal 
Reserve  (FED)  policy reaction function.  In the former  case,  the FED's 
behaviour was  assumed  to be  exogenous  and  thus  the effect of fiscal 
actions  on the money  stock was  sole 1  y due  to the private-sector's 
reactions.  In the latter case,  the effect of fiscal actions on the 
money  stock depended  upon  both the FED's  and  the private sector's 
reactions.  Their results  supported  the hypothesis  that the money 
stock is endogenous  and  that monetary policy accommodates  fiscal policy. 
M-B's  conclusion that monetary policy accommodates  fiscal policy is 
consistent with the arguments  presented by  Buchanan  and  Wagner  (1977) 
(B-W).  The  Journal of Monetary  Economics  (1978)  published a  symposium 
examining  the  issues raised by  B-W.  The  empirical  evidence presented 
in this symposium failed  to support  B-W's  propositions concerning  the 
size of real government  spending  and  the connection between budget 
deficits and  inflation. 
Barro  (1978)  argued that B-W's  assertion of a  shift in policy to the 
Keynesian  "new  debt doctrine" was  based  on an inappropriate reading of 
the data.  B-W  used nominal  debt;  Barro  employed  real debt.  Examining 
the ratio of  government  debt  to  GNP  in the United  States,  Barro observed 
that this ratio has declined,  on  average,  over  the post-WWII  period. 
He  also  found  no  statistical support  for  B-W's  proposition that there 
exists  a  link between money  growth and  government  deficits.  He 
concluded that"  •••  the principle link from  the federal  budget  to money 
creation in recent U.S.  experience  involves departures of federal 
spending  from  normal  ••• "  (1978,  p.  578).  The  budget deficit per se 
was  not  an  important determinant  of money  growth. (3) 
-II-
Niskanen  (1978)  examined  empirically the relationship between budget 
deficits and  the size of  government  spending  and  inflation in the 
United States.  He  tested a  demand  for  government  services equation and 
found  evidence of  a  significant relationship between budget deficits 
and  increases  in government  spending.  He  considered,  however,  the 
results  "suggestive but not conclusive" and  he called for more  research 
" •••  to test for  the effect of political conditions on federal  spending 
(1978,  p.  597).  In order to examine  the relationship between budget 
deficits and  inflation,  Niskanen developed  a  "crude theory" of  the money 
supply.  First,  he  estimated a  reaction function of  the monetary 
authorities allowing for  a  policy shift in  1966-67.  He  found  no  support 
for  the proposition that government deficits pressure the  FED  to 
increase  the money  stock.  Second,  based on the money  supply function, 
Niskanen derived  a  price equation which  incorporated the  combined  effects 
of  government deficits and  money  growth.  He  estimated both a  short-
and  long-run version of the model  and  found  that deficits were not 
significant.  While  lagged money  growth was  significant in explaining 
price movements,  he  concluded that"  •••  federal deficits do  not  have 
any  significant effects on the inflation rate operating either through 
or  independent  of  the rate of money  growth"  (1978  ,  p.  601). 
Several papers have appeared  commenting  on the articles published in 
the  B-W  symposium.  Hamburger  and  Zwich  (1981)  (H-Z)  adopted  essentially 
Barro's model  and  reexamined  the relationship between budget deficits 
and  money  growth over  two  sample periods  - 1954  to  1976  and  1961  to 
1974.  The  first period's results  supported Barro's conclusions,  money-
stock growth related to government  expenditure and  lagged unemployment 
rather than budget deficits.  The  second period's results, which was 
termed  the "Keynesian period",  suggested that budget deficits rather 
than government  spending affected money  growth.  They  concluded that 
" •••  monetary policy is strongly influenced by  the Federal Government's 
fiscal policy actions,  measured either by  expenditures or budget 
deficits."  (1981,  p.  149). 
" - 12-
In a  comment  on H-Z,  McMillin and  Beard  (1982)  (M-B)  reexamined  the 
fiscal-monetary  growth  linkage  employing  revised national  income  accounts 
data.  They  did not find  any  strong _evidence  of  a  positive budget 
deficit-money growth relationship in the post-1961  period.  In a  reply, 
H-Z  (1982)  argued  that M-B's  (1982)  findings differed from  H-Z  (1981)  not 
because  they employed  revised national  income  accounts data but  because 
of their  -" •••  mis-specification of  the  timing of deficits and  money 
growth."  (1982,  p.  283).  More  specifically,  H-Z  (1982)  argued  that 
M-B  (1982)  regressed current rates of money  growth on future deficits. 
H-Z  (1982)  reestimated their equations using the revised national  income 
accounts data;  they found  a  strong positive link between budget deficits 
and  money  growth.  In fact,  the  link was  strengthened when  data  through 
1981  was  added. 
So  far,  the discussion has  focused  on  the  role of budget deficits in 
affecting macroeconomic  activity- e.g.,  a  deficit is monetized  by  the 
monetary authorities due  to various pressures which  leads  to  inflation. 
The  basic question addressed  in most  of  the  empirical work  was  whether 
or not  budget deficits are inflationary.  Inflation,  however,  may  have 
feedback effects on the budget deficit and  money  growth.  That  is, there 
may  exist two-way  causality between  government  budget deficits and 
macroeconomic  activity (e.g.,  inflation). 
Several  scenarios have  been offered as  to  the  effect of  inflation on 
budget deficits.  The  simplest argument  states that if government 
expenditure  to  GNP  is held constant,  then as  inflation drives  taxpayers 
into higher marginal  tax brackets,  the deficit will be  reduced;  this 
is  the "fiscal-dividend"  ("fiscal-drag")  argument.  An  alternative view 
asserts  that as  prices rise,  the amount  of  government  expenditure rises 
more  rapidly than tax revenue.  Even  if the government  allows  tax revenue 
to  increase at the same  rate as  expenditure,  there will be  an  increase 
in both  the real  and  nominal  budget deficit due  to  the  lag in tax 
collection.6  Finally,  Barra  (1979) hasargued  that if the government -13-
holds  the ratios of government  expenditure and  tax revenue  to  GNP 
constant,  higher  expected inflation will lead to higher budget deficits. 
Several papers  have  appeared  on this question of  reverse causation. 
First, Dutton  (1979)  and  Aghevli  and  Khan  (1977,  1978)  among  others 
have  examined  the "self-perpetuating hypothesis" of  inflation and  its 
feedback  effect on  budget deficits.  Dutton  (1971)  developed  a  system of 
four  simultaneous  equations  explaining the rates of change of  the money 
stock,  the price level and  base money  and  the level of  the budget deficit. 
The  money  stock is endogenous  and  related to the budget deficit which, 
in turn,  depends  upon  the rate of  inflation.  Using  Argentinian data, 
he  concluded that the inflation process is self-perpetuating.  Aghevli 
and  Khan  (1977)  developed  a  dynamic  model  of  the  inflatio~ary process  in 
a  continuous-time framework  that incorporated the self-perpetuating effect 
between deficit financing  and  inflation.  The  model  consisted of  four 
first-order differential equations  for  the growth rates of  the price 
level, real government  spending,  nominal  tax revenue,  and  the money 
stock.  Using  Indonesian data,  they  found  a  one-to-one link between 
government  budget deficits  and  inflation.  They,  concluded that, 
" •••  the authorities should  aim  to keep  the goal of price stability by 
increasing the  speed of  adjustment  in their tax collection which would 
brake the vicious  cycle of  the self-perpetuating inflation".  (1977, 
p.  402).  Aghevli  and  Khan  (1978)  extended their analysis by modifying 
the model  and  examining  four  developing countries.  They  found  no 
significant lags of adjustment  for  government  spending but significant 
lags for  tax revenue;  the tax revenue  lags became  larger the greater 
the inflation rate was. 
Second,  Dwyer  (1982)  and  Ahking  and Miller  (1982)  have  examined  the 
existence of  two-way  causality between government  budget deficits and 
other macroeconomic variables  (e.g.,  money  growth).  Dwyer  (1982) 
employed  the  Sim's  (1980)  vector autoregressive method  for  the United 
States.  He  found  that budget deficits were  the result of  inflation and 
" •••  play no  role in determining inflation or other  important macro-
economic variables."  (1982,  p.  327).  Ahking  and  Miller  (1982)  examined -14-
the relationship between budget deficits, money  growth,  and  inflation 
in the United  States employing  Granger  causality tests as  developed 
by Granger  (1969,  1980)  and Ashley,  Granger  and  Schmalensee  (1980). 
Their results did not  support  the existence of a  budget deficit money 
growth link but  did  suggest  a  feedback relationship between budget 
deficits and  inflation. -15-
III.  CENTRAL  BANK  FINANCING  OF  GOVERNMENT  BUDGET  DEFICITS 
Before  embarking  upon  the  econometric analysis,  we  shall examine 
historically the degree of central bank financing of government  budget 
deficits.  We  computed  the average  annual  budget deficit over  five year 
periods  (where possible)  and  the percent of  the deficit financed  by 
central bank holdings  of  (net)  claims  on government.7  Table  1 reports 
the results of this calculation. 
Several general observations  can be made.  First, deficits appear  to 
be different beasts when  the  1960s  are compared  with the  1970s.  Deficits 
are larger in 1966-70  than in 1961-65  for  six of the eight  countries. 
Italy and  the United Kingdom  are  the  exceptions.  Deficits are larger in 
1976-80  than in 1971-75  in all countries.  Moreover,  there does  appear 
to be  a  general acceleration in the size of  the government  budget 
deficit.  For  example,  Belgium's deficit in 1966-70  is approximately 
one-and-a-half fold increase in the deficit from  1966-70  to  1971-75  and 
approximately a  two-and-three-quarter fold  increase  from  1971-75  to 
1976-79. 
Second,  along with the growing  size of  the government deficit,  there is 
a  tendency for  the central bank  to  finance  a  smaller and  smaller share 
of the deficit.  In the  1976-80 period,  central banks  financed  between 
4.6  and  13.6 percent of government deficits - the United Kingdom  is the 
exception with a  minus  2.6 percent financing.  The  range of financing 
percentages has  narrowed  considerably in an absolute sense.  In the 
1961-65  period,  the financing percentages varied from  minus  74.2 to  164.4 
percent.  The  Netherlands is the outlier in our  sample.  In the first 
three subperiods,  the central bank in the Netherlands  reduced,  on  average, 
its holdings of net claims  on government.  That  is,  the private sector, 
both domestic  a~d foreign,  financed  the deficit and  the central bank's 
reduction in net claims  on government.  It should be noted that Belgium, 
Germany,  and  the United Kingdom  each had  one  subperiod where  the central 
bank reduced its holding of  (net)  claims on government.  In addition, 
a  reduction in (net)  claims  on government  does not  imply necessarily that 
base money  fell.  Base  money  also adjusts  to  changes  in (net)  foreign 
8  assets held by  the central bank. -16-
IV.  FINANCING  GOVERNMENT  BUDGET  DEFICITS:  CENTRAL  BANK  REACTION  FUNCTIONS 
This  section systematically examines  how  the objectives of central bank 
policy affect  the financing  of  the  government  budget deficit.  We 
begin with  two  assumptions:  (i)  The  government  deficit is determined 
by  fiscal policy and  (ii)  The  central bank determines  how  the deficit 
is financed.  That is,  we  assume  that the levels of  dH  and  dR,  and  thus 
dB,  chosen to finance  the budget deficit are a  result of central bank 
policy decisions.  We  shall investigate this process by estimating 
central bank reaction functions  for  the choice variables.  Moreover, 
we  shall  impose  the cross-equation constraints  implied by  the  government 
budget  constraint. 
It is well-known that the parameter estimates  from  reaction functions  do 
not provide  information about  the actual  policymakers'  preferences.  The 
parameter estimates  combine  information on policymakers'  preferences 
along with the  reduced-form parameters of the macro-economy.  The  process 
can be visualized as  a  constrained optimization;  the reaction functions 
emerge  from  the maximization of  the policymakers'  preferences  (i.e., 
objective function)  subject  to the reduced-form equations  that describe 
the  economy  (or,  at least,  policymakers'  perception of the reduced-form 
equations).  Although methodologies  have  been developed  to  identify the 
separate influences,  this is beyond  the intent of this paper.9  We  are 
not deriving inferences  about  policymakers'  preferences.  Rather,  the 
parameter  estimates of our reaction functions  tell us  the response of 
policy instruments  to  changes  in policy targets. 
General  discussions of the objectives of policy usually consider four 
categories:  (i)  full employment  of resources,  (ii)  price stability, 
(iii) real economic  growth,  and  (iv)  external balance.  The  external 
balance  obje~tive depends  upon  the exchange-rate regime.  If the world 
economy  is operating under  a  fixed  exchange-rate regime,  then external 
balance  translates  into balance-of-payments  stability.  If,  on the other 
hand,  the world  economy  is operating under  a  flexible  exchange-rate -17-
regime,  then external balance translates  into  exchange rate stability. 
Since  our  sample  encompasses  both a  fixed  and  a  flexible exchange-rate 
regime  (i.e.,  19611  to  19821),  the reaction-function specifications differ 
between  the  two  regimes  (i.e., pre- and  post-March  1973). 
The  two  sets of reaction functions  are given as  follows: 
Fixed  Exchange-Rate  Period 
+e 
a 
b0+b1  dlny+b2  {(y-y) /y} +b3  {dlnP-dlnPw} 
+b
4(dR/Y_1)+b
5  {(G-T)/Y_1 } +eb 
(2) 
(3) 
where  a.+b.  = 0;  i  = 0,  1,  2,  3  and  a.+b.  = 1;  i  = 4,  5. 
1  1  1  1 
Flexible Exchange-Rate  Period 
dH/Y_1  = ao+a1dlny+a2  { (y-y) /y}  +a3dlnP 
(4} 
+ a4dlnEw+ ~ {(G-T)/Y_1 } + e
0 
dB/Y_1  =  B0+ 81 dlny+ 82  {(y-y) /y} + f3dlnP 
+ 84 dlnEw  + a 5  {(G-T) /Y  _1 } + e
6 
(5) 
-dR/Y_1  =  r0+ r1 dlny+ r2  {(y-y) /y} + y3dlnP 
+ r4 dlnEw  + YS  {(G-T) /Y  1 }+ e 
- y 
(6) 
where 
The  variables  employed  in  these  two  sets of  equations are  given as 
follows: 
dB  - change  in private-sector holdings  of  government  securities 
dR  - change  in central-bank holdings  of  (net)  for.eign assets, 
dH-dR  - change  in central-bank holdings_of  {net}  claims  on  government, 
y  trend value  of  nominal  10  - income, y 
y 
(y-y)/y 
dlny 
dlnP 
dlnP  w 
G-T 
dlnE  w 
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_  real  income, 
_  trend value  of  real  income, 
_  fractional  deviation of  real  income  from  its trend value 
(i.e., measure  of  resource  employment  level), 
_  rate  of  growth  of  real  income, 
_  domestic  inflation rate, 
_  world  inflation rate  faced  by  country!1 
- nominal  government  budget  deficit,  and 
- rate  of  change  of  effective  exchange  rate  faced  by  country!2 
See  the appendix for details on data sources  and  definitions. 
The  government  budget  constraint  imposes  the parameter restrictions 
given for the  two  sets of reaction functions.  During  the fixed  exchange-
rate regime,  the change  in  (net)  foreign assets  (i.e., dR)  becomes  a 
policy objective.  Consequently,  it appears  on  the right-hand side of 
the reaction functions.  The  exchange  rate is fixed  and  is therefore 
not  a  policy objective.  Moreover,  in the  long run,  the domestic 
inflation rate is linked to the world  inflation rate through Purchasing 
Power  Parity.  Thus,  we  have  included  the difference between domestic 
and world  inflation rates as  the policy objective. 
During  the  flex1ble exchange-rate regime,  the  change  in  (net)  foreign 
assets ceases  to be a  policy objective.  It is replaced by  the rate of 
change  of  the effective exchange rate faced  by  the country.  Consequently, 
dR  appears  in a  third reaction function.  Moreover,  flexible exchange 
rates unhinge  the domestic  inflation rate from  the world  inflation rate. 
Therefore,  we  have  the domestic  inflation rate as  a  policy objective 
instead of the difference between domestic  and  world  inflation rates. 
The  policy decisions that determine  the modes  of financing  the 
government  deficit occur prior to the attainment  of  complete  information 
on  the policy objectives.  For  example,  information on  the growth rate (4) 
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of real  income  is realized with a  lag.  Consequently,  the interpretation 
of the right-side variables with the exceptions of  the  government deficit 
and  the change in  (net)  foreign assets is that they are policymakers' 
forecasts. 
The  process  of  forecast  formation for  a  variable X can be represented 
as  follows: 
=  (7) 
where x!  is the forecasted value at  time t, It is the information set 
used  to forecast  Xt,  and  E is the expectations operator.  Thus,  X~ is the 
expected value of Xt  conditional upon  the  information set available 
at  time t. 
Different approaches have been adopted  in the reaction function literature 
to proxy these forecasted values.  First,  some  authors have  assumed  an 
autoregressive structure on the variable Xt. 13  That is, 
{8) 
where  ~s are the parameters  in the autoregressive  scheme  and P  is the 
t 
random  error.  Given knowledge  on the <5 s,  X  1,  X  2,  etc.,  then the 
t- t-
autoregressive structure is employed  to forecast Xt.  The  basic criticism 
of this approach is that it employs  too little information.  For  example, 
if one  is forecasting inflation,  then information on money  growth or 
unemployment  might  add  to the accuracy of  the forecast.  Of  course,  we 
desire  to model  policymakers'  behaviour.  Even if we  could  improve  our 
forecasts  by adding additional  information,  it would  be appropriate to 
utilize these forecasts  only if they reflect the actual forecasting 
behaviour of the policymakers.  That is, our forecasting procedure 
should be as efficient  (inefficient)  as  the procedure actually employed 
by  the policymakers. -20-
Second,  others adopt  a  perfect foresight  assumption;  the actual values 
are  taken as  policymakers forecasts  (i.e., x!  is proxied by Xt). 14  The 
basic criticism of this approach is that policymakers  are  endowed  with 
too much  ability.  If the control variables are fixed  for  the entire 
period,  then this  assumption is unrealistic.  That  is, how  can  the 
policymakers  know  the values  of  the policy objectives at the beginning 
of  the period when  the control variables are set?  If, on  the other 
hand,  the control variables are adjusted within the period as 
information on the policy objectives becomes  available,  then the 
perfect foresight  assumption begins  to make  some  sense.  We  are 
employing  quarterly data.  Within a  quarter,  the control variables do 
have  some  flexibility;  policymakers  can and  do  adjust the direction of 
policy within a  ·quarter.  Thus,  it seems  inappropriate to reject the 
perfect-foresight assumption without  further consideration. 
Third,  Abrams,  Froyen,  and  Waud  (1980)  have  adopted  a  middle  road 
between the autoregressive and  perfect-foresight assumptions;  they 
employ  "consistent" forecasts  in the reaction function.  The  procedure 
for  producing consistent forecasts  is outlined in McCallum  (1976). 
A consistent forecast of X is based  on past values of X as well  as  past 
values of other variables  that also  influence X. 
Although  the third approach of consistent forecasts  is preferable on 
many  grounds  we  have chosen the autoregressive and  perfect-foresight 
assumptions  in this paper.  An  advantage of our choice is that it 
provides  us  with two  benchmarks  along  the  information axis.  That is, 
one  approach is criticized because it assumes  too  much  information is 
used  (i.e., perfect foresight)  while  the other is criticized because 
too little information is used  (i.e., autoregressive). 
Empirical results 
The  results of  estimating the reaction functions  under  the  two  forecast 
assumptions  are presented in Tables  2  through 6.  Tables  2  and  3  are 
the  estimates of  the reaction functions  for  dH/Y_1  and  dB/Y_1, -21-
respectively,  during the first exchange-rate period.  The  sample  period 
for all countries  except  the United Kingdom  is  1961I  to  1970IV;  for  the 
United  Kingdom,  data problems restrict the  sample  to  1964I to  1970IV. 
Tables  4,  5  and  6  are  the  estimates of the  reaction functions  for 
dH/Y_1,  dB/Y_1,  and  (-dR/Y_1), respectively,  during the flexible exchange-
rate period.  Here,  the  sample periods are  1973II to  1979IV  for Belgium 
and  the Netherlands,  1973II to  1980II for Japan,  1973II to  1982I for 
France,  Italy,  and  the United Kingdom,  and  1973II to  1982II for  Germany 
and  the United  States.  In all cases,  data availability determined  the 
end  point of the various  samples. 
All  .  .  d  .  d.  1  15  s .  h  equat1ons  were  est1mate  us1ng· or 1nary  east  squares.  1nce  t  e 
independent variables are identical across  equations  in both the fixed 
and  flexible exchange-rate  systems,  the government  budget  constraint 
is automatically imposed  upon  the parameter estimates.  The  first set of 
estimates for  each country corresponds to the. perfect-foresight  (PF) 
assumption.  The  second set corresponds  to the autoregressive-forecast 
(AF)  assumption.  The  PF  assumption entailed the use of actual values for 
the right-side,  independent variables.  The  AF  assumption required the 
construction of  forecasts  from  equation  (8)  for all the right-side 
- - 16  variables except  dR/Y_1 and  (G-T)/Y_1 over the appropriate  sample period. 
Since we  employed  quarterly data,  we  used  four  lagged values  in all the 
autoregressive equations.  These equations were  employed  to construct 
the predicted values of the right-side variables in the AF  results. 
Several results stand out.  There was  a  marked  change  in the effect of 
government deficits on base-money  growth between  the fixed  and  flexible 
exchange-rate periods. 17  During fixed  exchange rates, most  countries 
exhibited a  significant,  positive effect of deficits on base-money 
growth.  Only  for  the United States was  the coefficient of deficits not 
significantly different from  zero.  BeLgium,  the Netherlands,  and  the 
United  Kingdom  had  coefficients that were  small  and  positive,  but  these 
coefficients were  significantly different from  zero.  Moreover,  Japan's 
coefficjent  was  not  significantly different  from  one  while Germany's 
coefficient  was  significantly greater  than one.  During  flexible -n-
exchange rates,  only Germany,  Italy,  the Netherlands,  and  the United 
Kingdom  had  coefficients of the deficit that were positive and  significant. 
In addition, all of these coefficients were  significantly less than one. 
An  increase in international reserves  leads  to an increase  in base 
money  unless  the central bank sterilizes the reserve flow. 18  During fixed 
exchange rates,  the coefficient of  changes  in international reserves  in 
the base-money  regression (i.e.,  a4)  gives  some  indication of the degree 
of sterilization.  The  results  suggested that only the Netherlands,  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  the United  States conducted significant amounts  of 
sterilization based  on the magnitude  of  a4•  After conducting tests to 
see if a4  differed significantly from  one at the  ten-percent  level, 
only Belgium,  the Netherlands  and  the United  Kingdom  had  coefficients 
significantly different from  one.  Thus,  in most  countries,  international 
reserve changes  were  allowed  to affect domestic base money.  This 
adjustment  in base money  is a  necessary prerequisite to the operation of 
a  fixed  exchange-rate  system.  On  the other hand  during flexible 
exchange  rates,  the rate of  change  in the  exchange rate faced  by  a 
country replaced  changes  in international reserves as  the policy 
objective.  That  is, international reserve changes  appeared as  a  third 
reaction function.  Given  the method  of measuring  exchange rates  (see 
footnote  12),  a  depreciation in the exchange rate meant  an increase in 
E  •  If central banks  intended to resist exchange-rate movements,  then  w 
a  depreciating  exchange rate should cause  the central bank to  intervene 
and  buy  domestic  currency and  sell foreign exchange  (i.e., R decreases). 
Thus,  y 4  is positive.  In Table 5,  the coefficient of dlnEw  (i.e.,y 4) 
was  positive in every  instance.  Moreover,  France,  Germany,  Italy, 
Japan,  and  the United Kingdom  had  coefficients that were  significantly 
positive.  This  suggests  that these countries were attempting to  smooth 
exchange  rate adjustments. 
During  fixed  exchange rates, five of  the eight countries had  coefficients 
of  the difference between domestic  and  world  inflation rates significantly -23-
different  from  zero in the base-money  regressions.  France  and  Germany 
had  negative coefficients.  This  sign is consistent with countercyclical 
monetary policy;  that is, an  increase  in domestic  relative to world 
inflation causes  a  reduction in base-money  growth.  Italy,  the United 
Kingdom,  and  the United  States had  significant, positive coefficients. 
This  sign is consistent with a  procyclical monetary policy.  During 
flexible  exchange  rates,  four  countries had  coefficients of domestic 
inflation significantly different from  zero  in the base-money regressions. 
Germany  and  the United  Kingdom  had  significantly negative coefficients 
while  Italy and  Japan had  significantly positive coefficients.  The 
former  results are consistent with a  countercyclical  policy while the 
latter are consistent with a  procyclical policy.  In sum,  Germany  had 
a  pattern of reaction function responses which  is consistent with a 
countercyclical policy during both fixed  and  flexible exchange  rates. 
On  the other hand,  Italy's pattern is consistent with a  procyclical 
policy. 
During fixed  exchange  rates,  only  two  countries had  coefficients of 
deviations of real  income  from  trend in the base-money regressions that 
were  significantly different from  zero.  France and  Italy both had 
positive coefficients;  that is, a  rise in real  income  above  trend 
caused  a  rise in base-money  growth.  This pattern is consistent with a 
procyclical monetary policy response.  During flexible  exchange rates, 
Italy and  the United Kingdom  had  significant, positive coefficients 
associated with deviations of real  income  from  trend.  Again,  this finding 
is consistent with procyclical policy.  In  sum,  once again Italy's 
pattern of reaction function responses  is consistent with a  procyclical 
policy under fixed  and  flexible  exchange  rates. 
During  fixed  exchange  rates,  only  two  countries had  coefficients of real 
output  growth in the base-money regressions  that were  significantly 
different  from  zero.  Japan's coefficient was  positive while  the United -~-
Kingdom's  coefficient was  negative.  A negative coefficient, which 
implies that a  rise in real output growth causes  a  fall in base-money 
growth,  is consistent with a  countercyclical monetary policy.  During 
flexible exchange rates,  three countries had  coefficients of real 
output  growth in the base-money  regressions that were  significantly 
different from  zero.  Belgium  and  France had  negative coefficients, 
consistent with a  countercyclical policy,  while Japan had  a  positive 
coefficient.  In sum,  Japan had  a  pattern of reaction function responses 
which is consistent with a  procyctical  policy under fixed  and  flexible 
exchange rates. 
During  fixed  exchange rates,  five countries had  constant terms  that 
were  significantly different from  zero  in the base-money regressions. 
Germany,  Italy,  and  Japan had  negative constant  terms  while  the United 
Kingdom  and  the United  States had  positive constant terms.  The  constant 
term implies  that there is a  positive or negative base-money  growth 
tendency in the central bank's reaction function not  explainable by  the 
variables  included in the regressions.  During  flexible exchange rates, 
only Japan had  a  constant  term significantly different from  zero.  Again, 
it was  negative. 
Finally,  the base-money  regressions during  the  fixed  exchange-rate 
period had  a  higher explanatory power,  as  measured  by F-statistics, than 
during  the flexible exchange-rate period.  Consequently,  the central 
bank's deficit financing decision appears  to have been more  responsive 
to policy objectives during fixed  exchange rates. -25-
V.  GOVERNMENT  BUDGET  DEFICITS  AND  ECONOMIC  ACTIVITY 
In this section,  we  examine  the  government  budget deficit's role in 
affecting macroeconomic  activity.  That  is, what  are the linkages, if 
any,  between the government deficit and  macroeconomic  variables  such 
as  the interest rate,  the inflation rate,  the unemployment  rate, etc 
Some  authors have attributed a  major  causal role to  government  deficits 
in the macro  economy.  For example,  high inflation rates, high interest 
rates,  etc.  have  been blamed  upon  high budget deficits.  This  view has 
19  been popular  in the United  States for  &everal  years. 
Nearly all the empirical analysis of  government deficits has  been based 
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on structural models.  Thus,  the tests of  the government deficit's 
effect on economic  activity are conditional  on  the structural specifications 
being correct.  If the structure is misspecified,  then conclusions  about 
the effect of deficits on economic  activity are open to question.  We, 
therefore,  are not  employing  structural macroeconomic  model  as  a  basis for 
our empirical analysis.  We  adopt  the vector autoregressive methodology 
as  suggested by  Sims  (1980).21  This  procedure  involves  the estimation of 
relatively unconstrained relationships among  the variables of interest. 
The  general  form  of the vector autoregression is as  follows: 
~  + 
0 
n 
I  ~izt-i  +  E:t 
i=l 
(9) 
where  Z  is a  one-by-m vector of variables,  •  is a  one-by-m vector of  t  0 
constants,  ~·  is a  m-by-m  matrix of coefficients at lag i, n  is the 
1 
number  of  lags  in the autoregression,  and  Et  is a  one-by-m vector  of 
error terms.  The  variables  included in Zt  are dlny,  (y-y)/y,  dlnP, 
dlnPW'  i, iw,  dlnW,  and  (G-T)/Y_1•  We  define ito be the domestic 
interest rate,  iW  to be  the world  interest rate faced  by  this country,22 
and  dlnW  to  be  the rate of  change  in the nominal  wage  rate.  This vector -~-
autoregression examines  the effect of government deficits on  economic 
activity, if any,  as well as  the effect of  economic  activity on government 
deficits,  if any. 
Empirical  Results 
Vector autoregression requires a  large sample in order to  estimate the 
model.  We  have  eight variables  in the vector autoregression and  have 
chosen to  include  four  lags of  each variable.23  Each  equation involves 
the estimation of 36  parameters  including the constant  term and  three 
seasonal  dummy  variables.  Consequently,  we  combined  the fixed  and 
flexible exchange-rate periods  in the estimation.  The  sample periods are 
as  follows:  Belgium  and  the Netherlands  (19611  to  1979IV),  Japan  (19611 
to  198011),  France and  Italy  (19611  to  19821),  the United  Kingdom  (19641 
to  19821),  and  Germany  and  the United States  (19611  to  198211). 
Since  the  same  right-side variables are  included  in all the vector 
autoregressions,  we  estimated using ordinary least squares  (See Zellner 
(1962}).  Although seasonally unadjusted data are preferable in the vector 
autoregression framework,  data constraints caused us  to  employ  seasonally 
adjusted data for dlny and  (y-y)/y for all countries  and  for dlnW  in 
Japan only.  Seasonal  dummy  variables were  included in all equations  to 
remove  seasonal factors.  Table  7  presents  the results that  examine 
whether or not government  budget deficits help  explain movements  in the 
variables listed across  the  top  of  the Table  (e.g.,  rlo  deficits help 
explain movements  in dlny?).  The  procedure  took  each of  the variables 
listed across  the  top of Table  7  and  regressed  them,  using ordinary 
least squares,  on four  lagged values of all the variables with and  then 
without  the deficit.  An  F-test was  performed  comparing  the regressions 
with and  without  the four  lagged values of the government  budget deficit. 
The  numbers  reported in Table  7  are F-statistics.  A significant F 
implies  that  government deficits contributed to explaining the variable 
at the head  of  the  column where  the F  is reported.  Table 8  presents 
results that  examine whether or not the variables across  the  top  of  the -27-
Table help  explain movements  in government  deficits.  Here,  the procedure 
was  to regress,  using ordinary least squares,  the  government  budget 
deficit on four  lagged values of all the variables  and  then to rerun the 
regressions but to  exclude,  one  at a  time,  the  four  lagged values  of the 
variable listed across  the  top of  Table 8.  The  numbers  reported  in 
Table  8  are also F-statistics.  A significant F  implies  that four  lagged 
values of the variable at the head  of  the column contribute to explaining 
movements  in the government deficit.  Finally,  the plus  and  minus  signs 
in Table  7  indicate whether the  sum  of the  four  coefficients on  the four 
lagged deficits is positive or negative.  The  plus  and  minus  signs  in 
Table  8  indicate whether  the  sum  of  the coefficients of  the four  lagged 
values of the variable at the head of  the  column  is positive or negative. 
First,  let us  examine  the results contained in Table  7.  Two  countries, 
Belgium and  the United Kingdom,  had deficits helping  to explain the 
domestic  interest rate.  Larger deficits led to a  higher domestic 
interest rate.  One  country,  Japan,  had deficits helping to explain 
domestic  inflation;  the  effect was  positive.  Italy had  deficits 
positively affecting both real output  growth and  deviations of real output 
from  trend.  All of  these results are consistent with popular views  about 
the effects of  government  budget deficits on economic  activity.  That is, 
deficits  stimulate output,  cause  inflation,  and  raise  interest rates. 
Germany,  on the other hand,  had deficits negatively affecting wage 
inflation.  Of  interest,  however,  is that if we  combine  the  two  real 
output effects,  none of these four  effects occured  in any one  country 
simultaneously.  Moreover,  for France,  the Netherlands,  and  the United 
States,  government deficits were  not helpful  in explaining any of the 
domestic  economic variables. 
Unexpected  findings  also occured.  In Italy and  Japan,  government  deficits 
helped explain the world  (i.e.  the United  States)  interest rate.  The 
effect was  positive in both instances;  higher deficits led to a  higher 
world  interest rate.  Also,  two  countries had deficits helping  to explain -28-
the world  inflation rate.  The  United Kingdom  had  higher deficits leading 
to higher world  inflation while France had  the opposite effect. 
Second,  let us  examine  the results  contained in Table  8.  Increases  in 
domestic  inflation led  to decreases  in deficits in Germany  and  Italy. 
This  finding  is consistent with the "fiscal dividend" argument  of  a 
progressive  tax system.  It also is consistent with a  countercyclical 
deficit policy.  Also,  increases in the world  inflation rate led  to 
increases  in deficits  in Belgium,  Germany  and  Japan.  A possible, if 
highly speculative,  rationalization of this result is as  follows~  If 
the world  inflation rate  of a  country  rises, this is a  signal  to 
domestic policy authorities that the world  economy  is expanding and  this 
allows  the domestic authorities  to  embark  upon  an  expansionary policy 
domestically and  increase the government deficit. 
Germany  had  an  increasing domestic  interest rate leading to a  r~s~ng 
deficit.  This  result is consistent with the view that deficits must 
rise as  interest rates rise because  one  of  the components  of  government 
expenses  is the interest cost  of  financing  the outstanding government 
debt.  But,  at the  same  time,  a  positive link between interest rates  and 
deficits might  be  indicating a  countercyclical deficit policy.  That  is, 
the contractionary effect of rising interest rates is countered with a 
rising government deficit.  Moreover,  in Germany,  a  rising world  (i.e., 
United  States)  interest rate led to a  declining government deficit.  This 
result is consistent with domestic authorities tightening the domestic 
policy screws  in response to rising interest rates in the rest of  the 
world.  In fact,  one might  be surprised that the world  interest rate 
had  such little significant effect on domestic budget deficits. 
Domestic  wage  inflation provided us with conflicting results.  Two 
countries had  wage  inflation affecting budget deficits significantly. 
France had  a  positive overall effect;  Germany  had  a  negative overall 
effect.  A positive overall effect is consistent with a  procyclical -29-
deficit policy;  that is, an increase in wage  inflation leading  to  an 
increase in budget deficits. 
The  effects of real variables also provided conflicting evidence.  Two 
countries had  significant effects of real output  growth  on deficits. 
France had  a·positive relationship while Germany  had  a  negative one. 
Once  again,  France's relationship is consistent with a  procyclical 
deficit policy.  France,  however,  also had  a  significant relationship, 
which was  negative,  between deviations of real output  from  trend  and 
government deficits.  A negative effect is consistent with a  countercyclical 
deficit policy. 
Finally,  in only one  instance did we  uncover  a  two-way  relationship. 
That is, government deficits affected an economic  variable  (Table  7)  and 
the  same  economic  variable affected government  deficits  (Table  8). 
The  two-way  relationship occured in Germany  for domestic wage  inflation. 
Moreover,  the  two  effects reinforce each other.  That is, a  rise in the 
deficit led to a  fall in wage  inflation and  a  fall in wage  inflation led 
to  a  rising deficit. - 30  __:_ 
VI.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
This  paper has  examined  in a  systematic way  the central bank's  financing 
of  the government  budget deficit as well as  the effect of  government 
budget deficits on  economic  activity and  vice versa across  a  sample of 
eight industrialized countries.  It is difficult to  summarize all the 
information contained in the regression analysis.  Nevertheless,  Tables  9, 
10  and  11  attempt  to organize  the results in an orderly fashion. 
Table  9  summarizes  the findings  concerning the central-bank reaction 
function estimates during  the fixed  exchange-rate period.  Here,  as  in 
Tables  10  and  11,  all of  the  conclusions are of  the  following  form: 
The  coefficient estimates of dlny for  the United Kingdom  are consistent 
with a  countercyclical  base-money policy.  We  are ~  infering directly 
that monetary  (or deficit)  policy is procyclical or countercyclical. 
Rather,  the results are consistent with  such interpretations.  A much 
more  detailed analysis  is required before one  can draw conclusions  about 
policy maker  preferences  (See  footnote  9). 
Most  of  the significant coefficients  in the first three columns  of 
Table  9  are associated with the difference between domestic .and  world 
inflation rates.  The  coefficients in France and  Germany  are consistent 
with a  countercyclical  base-money policy while in Italy,  the United 
Kingdom  and  the United  States the coefficients are consistent with a 
procyclical policy.  Regarding  the central bank's role in sterilizing 
international reserve  flows,  France,  Germany,  Italy and  Japan exhibit a 
pattern consistent with no  sterilization;  all other countries exhibit a 
pattern of partial sterilization.  Finally,  the central banks  had  varying 
degrees  of accommodating  the deficit through base-money  growth.  Germany 
and  Japan had  coefficients consistent with complete accommodation while 
the United State's coefficient was  consistent with no  accommodation. 
Table  10  summarizes  the findings  concerning central-bank reaction function 
regressions during  the flexible exchange-rate period.  Once  again,  the -31-
domestic  inflation rate had  the most  significant effects among  the first 
three columns.  Germany  and  the United Kingdom  had  coefficients that 
were  consistent with a  countercyclical policy while  Italy and  Japan 
had coefficients consistent with a  procyclical policy.  Belgium,  the 
Netherlands,  and  the United  States had coefficients of  dlnEW  consistent 
with a  policy of no  intervention in the  foreign  exchange markets.  All 
the other countries had  coefficients consistent with intervention aimed 
at stabilizing exchange rates.  Finally;  Germany,  Italy,  the Netherlands, 
and  the United Kingdom  exhibited a  pattern consistent with partial 
accommodation of the government  budget deficit through base-money  growth. 
The  other countries exhibited a  pattern of no  accommodation. 
Comparing  the results  from  the fixed  and  flexible exchange-rate periods, 
the following  consistent patterns  emerge.  First,  there was  a  higher 
degree of  accommodation  of budget deficits by  base-money growth during 
fixed  exchange rates.  Second,  the  four  countries  - France,  Germany,  Italy 
and  Japan - that exhibited a  pattern of  no  sterilization of reserve 
flows  during fixed  exchange  rates presented a  pattern of stabilizing 
intervention during flexible exchange  rates.  Third,  the German  reaction 
functions  were  consistent with a  countercyclical policy response  to 
changes  in domestic inflation over  both periods.  Fourth,  the Italian 
reaction functions  were  consistent with a  procyclical policy response 
to  changes  in domestic  inflation and  deviations  in real output  from 
trend over both periods.  Finally,  the Japanese reaction functions  were 
consistent with a  procyclical policy response  to  changes  in real output 
growth over both periods. 
Table  11  summarizes  the findings  concerning  the effect of  econqmic 
activity on  the governmental  budget deficit.  That  is,  we  are again 
interpreting resu1ts  as  being consistent with a  countercyclical or 
procyclical deficit policy.  Two  items  are  immediately obvious.  First, 
the results for Germany  form  a  consistent pattern across  four  of  the five -32-
variables  examined  in the Table;  budget deficits are responding  to 
economic  variables in a  way  that is consistent with a  countercyclical 
policy response.  It is also worth noting that this pattern for Germany 
also occured  in the reaction function results  summarized  in Tables  9 
and  10.  There,  however,  the possible countercyclical policy link was 
between base-money  growth and  domestic  inflation.  Second,  for most 
countries  (i.e., Belgium,  Japan,  the Netherlands,  the United Kingdom  and 
the United States),  we  do  not  find  a  significant link from  domestic 
economic  variables to budget deficits.24 
In Section II, we  reviewed  a  number  of articles that were directly or 
indirectly related to this paper.  It is,  therefore,  incumbent  upon  us 
to examine  how  our results  compare  with the existing literature.  By 
far,  the most  work  has  been done  examining whether or not  government 
budget deficits lead to base-money  or money  growth in the United  States. 
We  find  no  evidence  supporting  the assertion that deficits lead  to base-
money  growth either during fixed or flexible exchange rates in the 
United  States.  Thus,  our  findings  concur with Barro  (1978),  Niskanen 
(1978),  Dwyer  (1982),  McMillin and  Beard  (1982),  and  Ahking  and  Miller 
(1982)  but  run counter to Hamburger  and  Zwich  (1981,  1982)  and  McMillin 
and  Beard  (1980).25  Gordon  (1977)  examined  eight industrial countries 
and  concluded that the government deficit was  significant in the money 
equation with the correct sign only for Japan.26  We,  on the other hand, 
find  that during fixed  exchange rates,  the government deficit helped 
explain base-money growth significantly in every country except  the 
United  States.  When  we  examined  the flexible exchange-rate period, 
Belgium and  Japan joined the United  States in not having deficits help 
explain base-money  growth.  Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1981)  examined  the 
link between budget deficits and  money  growth  in seven,  mostly 
industrialized,  countries.  They  found  a  positive link between budget 
deficits and  money  growth  in three countries  (i.e., Guatemala,  Israel, 
and  Norway)  but no  link in the other four  ~i.e., Finland,  Ireland, 
South Africa,  and  Sri Lanka).  Willett  and  Laney  (1978)  found  that budget -33-
deficits  led to money  growth in Italy and  the United  Kingdom;  this is 
consistent with our results.  With  respect  to the United Kingdom,  Akhtar 
and  Wilford  (1979)  found  that budget deficits led to money  growth although 
the size of the effect was  small.  This  finding matches  closely our 
results for the United Kingdom. 27 
Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1981)  found  that all of the countries in their 
sample  except Finland had  changes  in net  foreign assets significantly 
and positively affecting money  growth.  This  is a  pattern that we  also 
found  for all countries  except  the United  States during fixed  exchange 
rates.  Willett  and  Laney  (1978)  found  a  significant, positive  effect 
of changes  in foreign assets on changes  in money  in Italy while  the 
United Kingdom  did not  have  a  significant effect.  We  had  significant 
effects for both Italy and  the United Kingdom.  Akhtar  and  Wilford  (1979), 
however,  found  a  positive and  significant link between changes  in 
international reserves  and  changes  in money  in the United Kingdom. 
Finally,  Dutton  (1971)  and  Aghevli  and  Khan  (1977,  1978)  proposed the 
"self-perpetuating hypothesis" of inflation.  Their analysis  examined 
developing countries but was  built on  work  associated with hyperinflation. 
Within our  sample,  we  find no  support  for this hypothesis.  We  do  not 
find  any  feedback effects between inflation and  government deficits. 
We  do  find  a  positive link from deficits to inflation in Japan and  a 
negative link from  inflation to deficits in Germany  and  Italy. 
Two  items  stand out as  future directions for research.  First, we  did 
not  experiment  in any  way  with  the objectives of central bank policy. 
Obvious  candidates for  consideration are interest rates and  wage 
inflation.  One  might  argue  that these objectives are  subsumed  in the 
objectives considered in this paper.  That  is,  the central bank's 
use of interest rate or wage  inflation objectives might  only be a 
means  to an  end  - the end  being the objectives of real output  growth, 
etc  •• Nevertheless, it might  be  instructive to  include an interest rate 
and  wage  inflation in the reaction functions.  Second,  in the vector -~-
autoregression analysis,  we  only employed  the government  budget deficit 
and  not  the financing modes.  Thus,  one  might  repeat  the vector auto-
regression techniques with that portion of  the deficit financed  by  the 
central bank as  an additional variable.  That is,  one  would  include both 
the government  deficit and  the central bank  financing  of  the deficit in 
the vector autoregression. -35-
APPENDIX 
Data Definitions and  Sources: 
The  follqwing data were  taken from  the  individual country pages of the 
International Monetary Fund's  International Financial Statistics  1973 
Supplement  for  1961-1969  and  the December  issues for  1970-1982. 
1.  Government  Deficit or Surplus,  Line 80. 
2.  Central  Bank  Holdings  of  (Net)  Claims  on Government: 
- Belgium,  France,  Italy,  and  United Kingdom,  Line  12a. 
-Germany,  Japan,  Netherlands  and  United States,  ~ine 12a-Line  16d. 
3.  Central  Bank  Holdings  of  (Net)  Foreign Assets: 
-Belgium,  Japan,  and  Netherlands,  Line  11. 
-France, Germany,  Italy,  United Kingdom  and  United States, Line  11-
Line  16c. 
4.  Exchange  Rates: 
- Australia,  Ireland,  and  United Kingdom,  Line rh. 
- Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Italy, 
Japan,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Spain,  Sweden,  and  Switzerland,  Line rf. 
As  sources for the following data,  we  used  the OECD/Main  Economic 
Indicators Historical Statistics  1960-1979,  the  1980  and  1981  December 
issues,  and  the November  issue of  1982  of the Main  Economic  Indicators. 
1.  Consumer  Price Index  (1975=100) 
2.  Wages  (1975=100): 
- Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy and  the United States:  Hourly Rates 
(Earnings)  in Manufacturing. 
-Japan:  Monthly  Earnings  in Manufacturing  (Adjusted). 
- Netherlands:  Hourly Rates  in Industry  (males)  for  1960-1969  and, 
Hourly Rates  in Manufacturing for  1970-1979  from  OECD/Historical 
Statistics Main  Economic  Indicators  1955-1971  and  1960-1979 
respectively. 
3.  Interest Rates: 
-France:  Bond  Yields  (issues guaranteed by  the government). 
- Belgium,  Germany,  Italy,  United Kingdom  and  the Netherlands:  Yield 
of Government  Bonds. 
-Japan:  Treasury Bill Rate  (60  days). 
- United States:  a)  Yield of Government  Bonds,  and 
b)  Treasury Bill Rate  (3  months). 
4.  Income: 
- Germany,  Japan,  and  United States:  Gross  National Product at current 
prices  (Adjusted) -36-
- Italy and  United Kingdom:  Gross  Domestic  Product at current market 
prices  (Adjusted). 
- Belgium,  France,  and  Netherlands:  Industrial Production  (Adjusted) 
(1975=100). 
5.  Implicit Price Deflator: 
- Germany,  Japan and  United  States:  The  Gross  National  Product 
Implicit Price Deflator  (1975=100). 
- Italy and  United Kingdom:  The  Gross  Domestic  Product  Implicit 
Price Deflator  (1975=100). -37-
FOOTNOTES: 
1.  See  Blinder and  Solow  (1973).  Also,  see Infante and  Stein's  (1976) 
critical review and  Blinder and  Solow's  (1976)  reply. 
2.  For  a  description of  the various avenues  through which  crowding  out 
can occur,  see Carlson and  Spencer  (1975). 
3.  For an alternative view of bond-financed government  expenditure,  see 
Buchanan  (1976). 
4.  As  noted above,  Buchanan rejects the notion that bond- and  tax-financed 
deficits are equivalent. 
5.  For  a  more  thorough review of  these and  related issues,  see Stevens 
( 1979) • 
6.  For  a  more  thorough review of  the  linkages between tax revenue  and 
inflation,  see Nowotny  (1980). 
7.  See  the appendix for details on data sources  and  definitions. 
8.  In the empirical  sections,  we  define changes  in base money  to equal 
changes  in  (net)  claims  on government  plus  changes  in (net)  foreign 
assets held by  the central bank. 
9.  Building upon  the work  of  Tinbergen  (1952)  and  Theil  (1964,  1965,  1968), 
Friedlander  (1973)  employed  the reduced-form equations  from  the FRB-
MIT-Penn  econometric model  to deduce  the  implied preferences of 
policymakers  during  the Eisenhower  and  Kennedy  administrations.  The 
preferences were  assumed  to be based upon  deviations  o.f  actual from 
"desired" policy targets  (i.e.  a  quadratic  loss function).  This 
methodology raises the problem of  identifying the desired policy 
targets.  In.a recent paper,  Cargill and  Meyer  (1981)  have  extended 
this methodology by  developing a  procedure whereby  policymakers' 
preferences are uncovered without prior knowledge  of desired policy IO. 
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targets.  Moreover,  by  solving sequentially over the  sample  period, 
they obtained time-varying  estimates of the  policymakers'  preferences. 
Although knowledge  of policymakers'  preferences  is of  interest,  the 
magnitude of  such an undertaking across  the countries  in our  sample  is 
enormous.  Thus,  we  have opted  for  the  simpler reaction-function 
approach. 
Trend values are calculated as  follows.  Let x  be  the variable in 
question.  We  first regress  the natural  logarithm of x  as  a  linear 
function of  time.  The  trend value of x  (i.e., i) is then computed 
based  on  the coefficient estimates  from  this regression. 
II.  The  world  inflation rate faced  by  a  country is a  trade weighted  index. 
The  weights  and  the methodology  in their construction is given in 
Robinson,  Webb  and  Townsend  (I979).  Eighteen countries are  included 
in the weighting  scheme.  Moreover,  the weights  compensate not only 
for direct trade competition between countries  but  also for  indirect 
trade competition in third countries. 
12.  The  world  exchange rate faced  by  a  country is also a  trade-weighted 
index.  The  same  weights  used  to construct  the world  inflation rate 
are used  to construct  the world  exchange rate.  See  footnote  II  for 
more  details.  Also,  it should be noted that the world  exchange rate 
as  constructed  in the empirical work  is domestic  currency per unit of 
foreign exchange.  For  example,  the world  exchange rate facing  the 
Netherlands is measured  as Guilders per basket of  the seventeen 
countries currencies.  Consequently,  a  depreciating  exchange rate means 
an increasing EW. 
I3.  See,  for  example,  Froyen  (I974)  and  Havrilesky,  Sapp,  and  Schwietzer 
(1975). 
I4.  See,  for  example,  Dewald  and  Johnson  (I967),  Friedlander  (1973)  and 
Havrilesky  (1967). -39-
15.  The  Time  Series Processor  (TSP)  2.8B  was  utilized in all the econometric 
analysis. 
16.  Ideally,  we  would  have preferred to  use prior data to estimate the 
autoregressive structure.  Data problems  prevented us  from  this 
approach.  Thus,  we  must  assume  that the autoregressive structure has 
not  undergone  a  structural shift. 
17.  We  have defined base money  to equal  (net)  claims on  government  plus 
(net)  foreign assets held by  the central bank.  All other factors  have 
been excluded. 
18.  We  have defined  international reserves  to  equal  (net)  foreign assets 
held by  the central  bank. 
19.  The  review of  the literature has  documented  some  of  this concern about 
government  budget deficits and  economic  activity.  See  Section II for 
details. 
20.  Exceptions are Dwyer  (1982)  and  Ahking  and  Miller  (1982). 
21.  For another description of  the vector autoregressive technique,  see 
Sargent  (1979). 
22.  We  are using the United  States interest rate as  a  proxy for the world 
interest rate faced  by  each country.  Of  course,  this implies  that  in 
the United States regression,  a  world  interest rate variable will not 
I 
appear. 
23.  Both  Sims  (1980)  and  Dwyer  (1982)  employ  four  lagged values  of each 
variable. 
24.  This  statement would  change if we  changed  the  significance level of 
the F-tests to twenty percent.  Several F-statistics just failed  to 
be  significant at the ten-percent  level. -~-
25.  Note  that M-B  came  to differing conclusions regarding this question 
in 1982  as  compared  to  1980.  They  offer no  explanation of  this 
inconsistency. 
26.  The  countries  included were  Canada,  France,  Germany,  Italy, Japan, 
Sweden,  the United Kingdom  and  the  United  States. 
27.  Also,  for  the United  Kingdom,  Cobham  (1980)  found  that monetary 
policy was  accommodating  during  the  1960s  but not during  the  1970s. 
We  find  possible accommodating  policy in both  the  1960s  and  the  1970s. -41-
Table  1:  Average  Annual  Government  Budget  Deficits  and 
Central  Bank  Financing  Percentages 
Country  1961-65  1966-70  1971-75  1976-80 
Belgium 
Deficit  15.64  25.24  63.44  '173.77 
Central  Bank(%)  58.2  3.2:  -1.3  4.9 
France 
Deficit  4.03  6.01  5.07  9.40 
Central  Bank(%)  51.7  4.3  35.7  4.6 
Germany 
Deficit  1.42  2.73  10.41  26.56 
Central  Bank(i'o)  133.4  -11.7  4.2  7.4 
Italy 
Deficit  816  615  1993  8794 
Central  Bank(%)  75.3  40.-.4  51.9  15.3 
Japan 
Deficit  206  638  2462  10,249 
Central  Bank(%)  67.8  64.8  35.5  8.3 
Netherlands 
Deficit  .10  1.87  1.63  9.78 
Central  Bank(%)  -74.2  -1.6  -48.6  9.7 
United  Kingdom 
Deficit  940  124  3285  8242 
Central  Bank(%)  78.5  235.8  14.7  -2.6 
United States 
Deficit  5.43  5.68  27.24  49.69 
Central  Bank(%)  164.4  74.6  21.5  13.6 
Note:  In all countries  except  the  U.K.,  the  deficit is measured 
in billions of  domestic  currency units (e.g.,  in Belgium, 
the  deficit is  in billions of  Francs).  The  U.K.  deficit is 
in millions  of  pounds.  Also,  for  Belgium and  the  Nether~ 
lands,  the  most  recentperiod  is  1976-79.  And  for  the U.K., 
the first period is  1964-65. Table  2:  Estimates  of  Equation  (2) 
Country 
Belgium(PF) 
(33) 
Belgium(AF) 
(30) 
France(PF) 
(33) 
France(AF) 
(30) 
Germany(PF) 
(33) 
Germany(AF) 
(30) 
Italy(PF) 
(33) 
Italy(AF) 
(30) 
Japan(PF) 
(33) 
Japan(AF) 
(30) 
Netherlands(PF) 
(33) 
Netherlands(AF) 
(30) 
United  Kingdom(PF) 
(21) 
United  Kingdom(AF) 
(18) 
United States(PF) 
(33) 
United  States(AF) 
(30) 
-.0001 
(-.64) 
.00002 
(.14) 
-.0001 
(-1.06) 
-.0001 
(-.86) 
-.0013* 
(-1.87) 
-.0021* 
(-1.73) 
-.0022" 
(-1. 76) 
-.0070* 
(-2.76) 
-.0020* 
(-2.16) 
-.0048* 
(-1.92) 
.00001 
(.63) 
.00002 
( .84) 
.0017* 
(2.39) 
.0020* 
(2.47) 
.0014* 
(4.46) 
.0008** 
(1.55) 
.0022 
(.88) 
-.0064 
(-.61) 
-.0004 
(-.28) 
.0001 
( .05) 
.0105 
(.37) 
-.0155 
(-.23) 
-.0358 
(-.66) 
.1849 
(.95) 
.0180 
(.56) 
.1429** 
( 1.  63) 
-.0004 
(-.62) 
-.0010 
(-.88) 
-.0751** 
(-1.  71) 
-.1462* 
(-1.  90) 
-.0060 
(-.25) 
.0733 
(1.25) 
-42-
-.0003 
(-.20) 
.0054 
(.40) 
-.0012  -.0026 
(-.72)  (-.08) 
.0008  -.0183** 
(.45)  (-1.52) 
.0042**  -.0562* 
( 1.  6  5)  ( -3 • 2  8) 
.0190 
(1.08) 
.0261 
(1.19) 
.0837* 
(2.84) 
.1241"'~ 
(3.94) 
.0018 
(.30) 
-.0006 
(-.10) 
.00001 
(.07) 
-.00003 
(-.14) 
.0264 
(.75) 
.0514 
(.90) 
-.0060 
(-.97) 
-.0037 
(-.50) 
-.0698 
(-.62) 
-.3442** 
(-1.55) 
.3511* 
(3.18) 
.6853* 
(3.87) 
.0161 
(.  41) 
-.0701 
(-.47) 
.0012 
(1.28) 
.0023 
(.97) 
.2654* 
(3.51) 
.5125* 
(2.40) 
.0634** 
( 1.  69) 
.1280* 
(1.98) 
.7976* 
(9.17) 
.8048* 
(8.97) 
1.0612* 
(7.51) 
1.1595* 
(10.19) 
.8948* 
(12.58) 
.8813* 
(10.66) 
1.1587* 
(8.57) 
1.1679* 
(9.41) 
1.2283* 
(4. 72) 
1.4801* 
(4.82) 
.3523* 
(2.01) 
.3937* 
(2.27) 
.1145* 
(2.02) 
.1640* 
(2.66) 
.5746* 
(1.99) 
.4744** 
·( 1.39) 
.1449* 
(1.95) 
.1570* 
(2.13) 
.4539* 
(2.55) 
.5504* 
(4.06) 
1.4334* 
(6.83) 
1.5007* 
(7.51) 
.6235* 
(6.68) 
.7971* 
(7.97) 
F 
17.72 
~.24 
12.46 
23.53 
46.86 
45.02 
27.24 
32.14 
1.0288*  175.96 
(25.10) 
1.0092*  171.43 
(24.48) 
.2443* 
(2.66) 
.2570* 
(3.10) 
.2079ff 
(6.47) 
.1936* 
(5.38) 
.0041 
(.17) 
.0038 
(.15) 
2.68 
2.52 
13.21 
10.87 
1.73 
1.79 
D-W 
2.72 
2.44 
3.26 
3.09 
2.21 
2.32 
2.37 
2.24 
2.27 
2.17 
2.89 
3.02 
2.26 
1.85 
2.19 
2.02 -43-
Table  2  continued 
Note:  All regressions were  performed on  the Time  Series Processor  (TSP) 
2.8B.  All equations are estimated using ordinary least squares. 
Numbers  under  coefficients in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Numbers  under countries in parentheses are degree of  freedom. 
PF  means  the perfect-foresight assumption while AF  means  the 
autoregressive-forecast assumption.  All tests are two-tailed. 
*·  Means  the coefficient is significantly different from  zero 
at the  ten-percent  level. 
**  at the  twenty-percent level. -44-
T~ble  3~  Estimates  of  Equation  (3) 
Country  bo  bl  b2  b3  b4  b5  F  D-W 
Belgium(PF)  .0001  -.0022  .0003  -.0054  .2024*  .8551*  33.75  2.72 
(33)  (.64)  (-.88)  (.20)  (-.40)  (2.33)  (11.51) 
Belgium(AF)  -.00002  .0064  .0012  .0026  .J952*  .8430*  35.73  2.44 
(30)  (-.14)  (.61)  (.72)  (.08)  (2.18)  (11.46) 
France(PF)  .0001  .0004  -.0008  .0183**  -.0612  .5461*  7.48  3.26 
(33)  (1.06)  (.28)  (-.45)  (1.52)  (-.43)  (3.06) 
France(AF)  .0001  -.0001  -.0042**  .0562*  -~1594  .4496*  11.71  3.09 
(30)  (.86)  (-.05)  (-1.65)  (3.28)  (-1.40)  (3.32) 
Germany(PF)  .0013*  -.0105  -.0190  .0698  .1052**  .,..4334*  2.21  2.21 
(33)  (1.87)  (-.37)  (-1.08)  (.62)  (1.48)  (-2.07) 
Germany(AF)  .0021*  .0155  -.0261  .3442**  .1187**  -.5007*  2.33  2.32 
(30)  (1.73)  (.23)  (-1.19)  (1.55)  (1.44)  (-2.51) 
Italy(PF)  .0022*  .0358  -.0837*  -.3511'~'~  -.1587  .3765*  5.36  2.37 
(33)  (1.76)  (.66)  (-2.84)  (-3.18)  (-1.17)  (4.03) 
ltaly(AF)  .0070*  -.1849  -.1241'~'(  -.6853*  -.1679**  .2029*  6.62  2.24 
(30)  (2.76)  (-.95)  (-3.  94)  (-3.87)  (-1.35)  (2.03) 
Japan(PF)  .0020*  -.0180  -.0018  -.0161  -.2283  -.0288  0.66  2.27 
(33)  (2.16)  (-.56)  (-.30)  (-.41)  (-.88)  (-.70) 
Japan(AF)  .oo·48*  -.1429**  .0006  .0701  -.4801**  -.0092  1.11  2.17 
(30)  (1.92)  (-1.63)  (.10)  (.47)  (-1.56)  (-.22) 
Netherlands(PF)  -.00001  .0004  -.00001  -.0012  .6476*  .7557*  14.48  2.89 
(33)  (-.63)  (.62)  (-.07)  (-1.28)  (3.69)  (8.21) 
Netherlands(AF)  -.00002  .0010  .00003  -.0023  .6063*  .7430*  17.49  3.02 
(30)  (-.84)  (.88)  (.14)  (-.97)  (3.49)  (8.96) 
United Kingdom(PF)  -.0017*  .0751**  -.0264  -.2654*  .8855*  .7921*  125.62  2..Lr. 
(21)  (-2.39)  (1.71)  (-.75)  (-3.51)  (15.63)  (24.67) 
United Kingdom(AF)  -.0020*  .1462*  -.OS14  -.5125*  .8360*  .8064*  107.60  1.85 
(18)  (-2.47)  (1.90)  (-.90)  (-2.40)  (13.57)  (22.42) 
United States(PF)  -.0014*  .0060  .0060  -.0634**  .4254**  .9959*  370.27  2.19 
(33)  (-4.46)  (.25)  (.  97)  (-1.69)  (1.47)  ( 42.53) 
United States(AF)  -.0008**  -.0733  .0037  -.1280*  .5256**  .9962*  330.22  2.02 
(30)  (-1.55)  (-1.25)  (.50)  (-1.98)  (1.54)  (40.47) 
Note:  See  Table  2 -45-
Table  4~  Estimates  of  Equation  (4) 
Country  ao  al  a2  a3  a4  a5  F  D-W 
Belgium(PF)  .0005  -.0144*  .0015  -.0145  -.0062  .0308  1.67  1.74 
(21)  ( 1.19)  (-2.66)  (.55)  (-.74)  (-.68)  (.51) 
Belgium(AF)  .0003  -.0102  .0024  -.0070  -.0037  .0476  0.43  2.03 
(21)  (.65)  (-.98)  (.79)  (-.30)  (-.16)  (.72) 
France(PF)  .0007  -.0142"'"  -.0016  -.0120  -.0106**  -.2364** 1.94  2.35 
(30)  (1.08)  (-1.78)  (-.66)  (-.46)  (-1.56)  (-1.37) 
France(AF)  -.0002  -.0350*  -.0018  .0275  -.0108  -.1927  1.92  2.34 
(30)  (-.16)  (-2.14)  (-.68)  (.53)  (-.88)  (-1.10) 
Germany(PF)  ·-.0008  -.0323  -.0046  -.2146**  -.0917*  .6037*  3.55  2.51 
(31)  (-.28)  (-.39)  (-.19)  (-1.58)  (-2.96)  (2.04) 
Germany(AF)  .0006  .3918  -.0058  -.4329*  -.1385** .4512**  2.99  2.86 
(31)  (.16)  (1.27)  (-.23)  (-2.32)  (-1.36)  (1.48) 
Italy(PF)  -.0116  -.0355  .1908*  .2652**  .0350  .4659*  1.53  1.60 
(30)  (-1.03)  (-.24)  (1.80)  (1.37)  ( .42)  (1.87) 
Italy(AF]  .0060  -.3612  .1429  -.0763  .0706  .4233**  0.60  1. 76 
(30)  (.21)  (-.79)  ( 1.  OS)  (-.12)  (.32)  (1.48) 
Japan(PF)  -.0090**  .1243**  -.0398  .2721*  -.0165  .1876  1.09  2.58 
(23)  (-1.54)  (1.47)  (-1.12.)  ( 1. 76)  (-.33)  (.88) 
Japan(AF)  .0025  .2354  .0058  -.1422  .0070  .1056  0.33  2.83 
(23)  (.25)  (.99)  (.13)  (-.39)  (.OS)  ( .47) 
Netherlands(PF)  -.0001  -.0002  -.0003  .0038  .0008  .2183**  1.65  2.91 
(21)  (-1.10)  (-.17)  (-.97)  ( 1.19)  ( .47)  (1.41) 
Netherlands(AF)  -.00003  .0015  -.0001  .0009  .0002  .2909*  1.22  2.92 
(21)  (-.35)  (.53)  (-.45)  (.19)  ( .06)  (1.94) 
United Kingdom(PF)  .0014  .0099  .0424*  -.0980*  .0020  .2588*  4.36  2.35 
(30)  ( .81?  (.20)  (1.86)  (-2.17)  (.10)  (3.85) 
United Kingdom(AF)  .0014  -.1030  .0166  -.1299  .1277**  .2771*  4.11  2.31 
(30)  (.32)  (-.61)  (.53)  (-1.07)  ( 1.  61)  (4.12) 
United States(PF)  -.00003  .0080  -.0019  .0479  .0155')\'*  -.0216  0.93  1.77 
(31)  (-.03)  (.30)  (-.14)  (.98)  (1.62)  (-.48) 
United States(AF)  .0008  .0373  .0073  .0082  .0079  -.0293  0.41  1.82 
(31)  (.43)  ( .38)  (.  47)  (.11)  (.27)  (-.66) 
Note:  See  Table  2. -46-
Table  5:  Estimates  of  Equation  (5) 
Country  80  61  82  83  84  65  F  n--w 
Belgium(PF)  .0001  .00001  -.0003  -.0047  -.0025  .9172*  85.36  2.63 
(21)  (.  43)  (.  001)  (-.16)  (-.31)  (.34)  (19.38) 
Belgium(AF)  .0001  -.0047  -.0007  -.0026  -.0133  .9145*  88.34  2.59 
(21)  (.23)  (-.Q7)  (-.33)  (-.17)  (-.84)  (20.18) 
France(PF)  -~0002  .0016  -.0005  .0082  -.0004  .8517*  55.66  2.90 
(30)  (-.89)  ( .64)  (-.63)  (1.03)  (-.18)  (16.10) 
France(AF)  .0001  .0027  -.0003  -.0056  .0066*  .8563*  63.73  2.87 
(30)  (.29)  (.57)  (-.43)  (-.37)  (1.85)  (16.94) 
Germany(PF)  .0028  .0731  -.0207  .1111  .0285  .0708  0.72  3.16 
(31)  (1.02)  (.88)  (-.84)  (.80)  (.90)  (.24) 
Germany(AF)  -.0012  .2953  -.0272  .3246*  .0307  .1540  1.18  3.24 
(31)  (-.36)  (1.00)  (-1.11)  ( 1.  82)  (.32)  (.53) 
Italy(PF)  .0068  -.0205  -.1452~b':  -.0073  -.1294*  .6296-f:  8.74  1.49 
(30)  (.74)  (-.17)  (-1.67)  (-.05)  (-1.90)  (3.09) 
Italy(AF)  -.0029  -.0140  -.1844**  .3862  -.3807*  .6196*  7.52  1.29 
(30)  (-•. 12)  (-.04)  (-1.69)  (.77)  (-2.15)  (2.71) 
Japan(PF)  .0072  -.0888  .0211  .2397**  -.0019  .7891*  5.14  2.75 
(23)  ( 1.  24)  (-1.06)  (.60)  (-1.57)  (-.04)  (3.74) 
Japan(AF)  -.0098  -.1475  -.0406  .3461  -.0733  .8771*  4.37  2.83 
(23)  (-1.01)  (-.65)  (-.92)  (.99)  (-.60)  (4.06) 
Netherlands(PF)  .0001*  .0001  -.00003  -.0023**  -.0005  .3412*  4.86  2.09 
(21)  (2.93)  (.22)  (-.16)  (-1.45)  (-.62)  (4.29) 
Netherlands(AF)  .00002  -.0011  -.0002**  .0010  -.0037*  .3222*  6.06  2.32 
(21)  ( .46)  (-.81)  (-1.41)  (.47)  (-2.11)  (4.64) 
United  Kingdom(PF)  .0023  .0068  -.0243  .0648  -.0488**  .6366*  7.32  2.18 
(30)  (.74)  ( .08)  (-.62)  (.83)  (-1.41)  (5.46) 
United  Kingdom(AF)  .0058  .1571  -.0027  .0361  -.2520*  .5653*  7.91  1.94 
(30)  (.81)  (.55)  (-.05)  (.18)  (-1.89)  (5.01) 
United States(PF)  -.0002  -.0045  .0013  -.0345  -.0179*  1.0481*  125.52  1.75 
(31)  (-.16)  (-.16)  (.09)  (-.64)  (-1. 70)  (21.47) 
United States(AF)  -.0007  -.0603  -.0061  -.0050  -.0140  1.0509*  116.99  1.75 
(31)  (-.33)  (-.56)  (-.36)  (-.06)  (-.43)  (21.62) 
Note:  See  Table  2. -47-
Table  6:  Estimates  of  Equation  (6) 
Country 
Belgiurn(PF) 
(21) 
Belgium(AF) 
(21) 
France(PF) 
(30) 
France(AF) 
(30) 
Germany(PF) 
(31) 
Gerrnany(AF) 
(31) 
Italy(PF) 
(30) 
ltaly(AF) 
(30) 
Japan(PF) 
(23) 
Japan(AF) 
(23) 
Netherlands(PF) 
(21) 
Netherlands(AF) 
(21) 
United  Kingdorn(PF) 
(30) 
United  Kingdom(AF) 
(30) 
United States(PF) 
(31) 
United  States(AF) 
(31) 
-.0006**  .0144*  -.0012 
(-1.42)  (2.46)  (-.40) 
-.0004 
(-.77) 
-.0006 
(-.89) 
.0001 
(.08) 
-.0020 
(-.81) 
.0006 
(.21) 
.0048 
( .43) 
-.0031 
(-.12) 
.0018 
(.  93) 
.0072* 
(2.71) 
.00003 
(-.38) 
.00001 
(.14) 
-.0037* 
(-1.74) 
.0419**  -.0017 
(1.38)  (-.54) 
.0126* 
(1.73) 
.0323* 
(2.07) 
-.0408 
(-.54) 
-.6872* 
(-2.57) 
.OS"1 
(.37) 
.3751 
(.89) 
-.0355 
(-1.27) 
-.0879** 
(-1.39) 
.0001 
( .05) 
-.0004 
(-.16) 
-.0168 
(-.29) 
.0021 
(.93) 
.0021 
(.85) 
.0253 
( 1.13) 
.0330** 
( 1.  48) 
-.0456 
(-.43) 
.0415 
(.33) 
.0187* 
(1. 58) 
.0348* 
(2.86) 
.0004 
(1.02) 
-.0072~~  -.0541 
.0003 
(1.13) 
-.0181 
(-.66) 
-.0138 
(-.36)  (-1.35)  (-.26) 
.0003 
(.71) 
-.0001 
(-.24) 
-.0034 
(-.45) 
.0005 
(.14) 
.0230  -.0012 
(.83)  (-.28) 
Note:  See  Table  2 
.0193 
(.91) 
.0096 
(.40) 
.0038 
(.16) 
-.0220 
(-.44) 
.1034 
(.82) 
.1083 
(.67) 
-.2579** 
(-1.32) 
-.3098 
(-.54) 
-.0324 
(-.63) 
-.2038* 
(-2.11) 
-.0014 
(-.44) 
-.0019 
(-.41) 
.0332 
(.61) 
.0939 
(.62) 
-.0134 
(-.95) 
-.0031 
(-.16) 
.0087 
(.88) 
.0171 
(.70) 
.0109* 
(1.77) 
.0042 
(.36) 
.0632* 
(2.20) 
.1078 
(1.22) 
.0944 
( 1.13) 
.0519 
(.80) 
.0379 
(.55) 
.3847* 
(2.44) 
.3365* 
(2.01) 
.3255 
(1.19) 
.3948** 
(1.50) 
-.0955 
(-.38) 
.3101**  -.0429 
(1.52)  (-.16) 
.0183 
(1.12) 
.0663* 
(1.96) 
-.0002 
(-.14) 
.0035 
( .93) 
.0468* 
(1.94) 
.1243 
(1.26) 
.0023 
( .85) 
.0233 
(.33) 
.0173 
(.29) 
.4405* 
(2.75) 
.3869* 
(2.64) 
.1047 
(1.29) 
.1577~ 
(1.89) 
-.0265* 
(-2.07) 
.0061  -.0217* 
(.  74)  (-1. 74) 
F  D-W 
1.55  1.67 
0.62  1.78 
2.81  2.36 
2.09  2.22 
1.72  2.32 
2.35  2.34 
0.58  1.30 
0.85  1.21 
1.13  1.76 
3.13  2.03 
1.67  2.76 
1.85  2.70 
1.76  1.62 
1.18  1.42 
1.22  1.61 
1.00  1.56 -48-
Table  7:  Effect  of  Government  Budget  Deficits  on  Economic  Activity 
Country  dlny  (y-y)/y  dlnP  dlnPW  dlnW  i 
Belgium  0.36  0.33  0.66  2.08  1.63  3.37* 
(4,36)  (+)  (-)  (-)  (+)  (+)  (+) 
France  0.86  0.95  0.34  2.82*  1.31  0.36 
(4,45)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (-)  (+)  (-) 
Germany  1.20  1.14  0.90  1.36  3.05*  1.98 
(4,46)  (-)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (-)  (-) 
Italy  2.51**  2.50**  1.95  1.15  0.88  1.56 
( 4,  45)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+) 
Japan  0.21  0.18  3.46*  1.63  1.88  0.88 
(4138)  (-)  (-)  (+)  (-)  (-)  (+) 
Netherlands  0.30  0.17  0.82  0.33  1.93  0.72 
(4~36)  (+)  (+)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (+) 
United  Kingdom  0.15  0.19  1.58  2.31**  1.99  2.65** 
(4,33)  (+)  (+)  (-)  (+)  (-)  (+) 
United  States  1.65  1.23  0.67  1.01  1.97  0.61 
(4,50)  (+)  (+)  (-)  (-)  (+)  (+) 
Note:  Numbers  are  F-statistics.  Degrees  of  freedom are  listed in 
parentheses  under  each country.  The  plus  and minus  signs 
indicate whether  the  sum  of  the  coefficients on  the  four  lagged 
deficits were  positive or negative,  respectively. 
*means  the F-statistic is significant at  the  five-percent  level. 
**at  the  ten-percent  level. 
iw 
1.49 
(+) 
0.39 
(-) 
1.47 
(-) 
5.66* 
(+) 
2.15** 
(+) 
1.56 
(+) 
1.95 
(+) -49-
Table  8:  Effect  of  Economic  Activity  on  Government  Budget  Deficits 
Country  dlny  (y-y)/y  dlnP  dlnPW  dlnW  i  iw 
Belgium  0.91  1.58  0.20  2.12**  0.68  0.19  0.84 
(4,36)  (+)  (-)  (-)  (+)  (-)  (-)  (+) 
France  3.79*  5.  96-lr  0.63  Oo.SO  3.78*  o.qo  1.51 
(4,45)  (+)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (+)  (+)  (-) 
Germany  3.01*  1.60  2.74*  5.63*  4.68*  2.57**  7.75* 
(4,46)  (-)  (+)  (-)  (+)  (-)  (+)  (-) 
Italy  0.98  0.92  3.48*  1.48  0.93  1.55  o.  76 
(4,45)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (-) 
Japan  1.86  1.71  0.79  6.37*  1.11  2.06  0.98 
(4,38)  (+)  (-)  (-)  (+)  (-)  (-)  (-) 
Netherlands  0.14  1.00  2.00  0.63  1.71  0.90  0.50 
(4,36)  (-)  (-)  (+)  (+)  (-)  (+)  (-) 
United  Kingdom  2.10  1.46  1.39  1.31  1.88  1.98  1.44 
(4,33)  (+)  (+)  (-)  (+)  (+)  (-)  (+) 
United States  0.90  0.63  1.61  0.38  0.91  0.63 
(4,50)  (+)  (-)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (-) 
Note:  Numbers  are F-statistics.  Degrees  of  freedom  are  listed in 
parentheses  under  each  country.  The  plus  and minus  signs 
indicate whether  the  sum  of  the coefficients of  the  four  lagged 
values  of  the  column  variable were  positive or negative, 
respectively. 
*means  the F-statistic is significant at  the  five-percent  level. 
**at  the  ten-percent  level. -50-
Table  9:  Possible Policy  Implications  of  Reaction Function Regressions: 
Fixed  Exchange  Rates 
Country  dlny  (y-y)/y  dlnP-dlnPW  dR/¥_1  {G-T)/Y_1 
Belgium  PS 
France  PC  cc  NS 
Germany  cc  NS 
Italy  PC  PC  NS 
Japan  PC  NS 
Netherlands  PS 
United  Kingdom  cc  PC  PS 
United States  PC 
Note:  In  the  first  th~ee columns,  PC  means  procyclical and  CC 
means  countercyclical.  In  column  four,  NS  means  no 
sterilization and  PA  means  partial sterilization.  In 
column  five,  CA  means  complete  accomodation,  PA  means 
partial accomodation,  and  NA  means  no  accomodation. 
PA 
PA 
CA 
PA 
CA 
PA 
PA 
RA -Sl-
Table  10:  Possible  Policy  Implications  of  Reaction Function  Regressions: 
Flexible  Exchange  Rates 
Country  dlny  (y-y) /y  dlnP  dln~  (G-T)/Y_1 
Belgium  cc  NI  NA 
France  cc  SI  NA 
Germany  cc  SI  PA 
Italy  PC  PC  SI  PA 
Japan  PC  PC  Sl  RA 
Netherlands  RI  PA 
United  Kingdom  ;...  PC  cc  SI  PA 
United States  RI  NA 
Note:  See  Table  9.  In  column  four,  NI  means  no  intervention 
and  SI means  stabilizing intervention. - S2-
Table  11:  Possible  Policy  Implications  of  Vector  Autoregressions 
Country  dlny  (y-y) /y  dlnP  dlnW  i 
Belgium 
France  PC  cc  PC 
·Germany  cc  cc  cc  cc 
Italy  cc 
Japan 
Netherlands 
United Kin$dom 
United States 
Note:  In all columns,  PC  means  procyclical  and  CC  means 
countercyclical. -53-
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